I would classify myself as an economist with one primary and one secondary research interest.

With respect to my primary research interest in the economics of science, I have a research interest in how the scholarly communication process is organized and financed. My efforts in this area have been devoted to the invention and use of author charges by journals in the sciences. More recently I have been involved in investigating the role of quasi-public organizations on the organizational and financial structure of disciplines in the physical sciences.

With respect to my secondary research interest in labor economics, I have a research interest in the default asset that many reluctant or passive retirement savers utilize in their defined contribution pension plans. My efforts in this area have been devoted to critiquing aspects of the Pension Protection Act of 2006.

Research Agenda


My research agenda is two-fold. My research agenda first involves further delineating the ‘new’ economics of scholarly communication research methods. My research agenda second involves examining how to increase the economic security during retirement for low- and middle-income households.

Economics of Science:


Given that research is a process conducted by groups of specialized scholars who build from each other’s work, a critical component to the research and development process is the publication of results. Research results lose their value when they are not fully and rapidly made available to others. The issue of concern at present is that researchers in many disciplines are encountering a lack of access to comprehensive collections of research results. When these research results are collected in a journal, this lack of access is referred to as the serials crisis. Although there are many cited causes to the crisis, many agree that the solution will arise as scholarly communities embrace electronic communication methods. While great strides are being made to develop comprehensive electronic academic resources, very little research is being done on how to finance it. Even less research is being done on the consequences when it is financed in a particular way. My research collects and draws extensions from these lost threads and concerns.

My research investigates whether research productivity within the university setting would increase if universities devoted more resources to the publication of research results and if scholars themselves directed these resources. Universities in the United States contribute funding to the scholarly communication process in the form of reader subscriptions. It seems theoretically possible that scholars and the university could benefit more from a scholarly communication process that is funded by authors who have an awareness of the costs of the scholarly communication process. In an author funded scholarly communication process efficiency gains are realized and ownership and control over the intellectual property contained within each article is retained within academic communities. To explore this issue I seek to create a database on the particulars on the production of knowledge within the university setting, identify those scholarly communities where an author charge supported scholarly communication would achieve efficiency gains, highlight the intellectual consequences to scholarly communities and universities when this pricing mechanism is employed, and explore the organizational format of such a scholarly communication process (who would be the publishers, what types of technology would be used, where would the money come from, and who would own and control the intellectual property within the scholarly article).

Labor Economics:

As the economic security for the aged provided by the employer transitions away from defined benefit pension plans and towards defined contribution pension plans, research in neoclassical economics and behavioral finance has focused on how best to design savings plans that serve passive investors (investors whose decision is to do nothing). When these defined contribution pension plans were first devised, these passive investors not only had to make the decision to enroll in the program, but also had to select a contribution rate and where to invest their contributions. Not surprisingly, the participation rate among the most passive of investors (members of low- and middle-income households) was abysmally low. More recently, defined contribution pension plans have been reconfigured such that the decision to enroll in a defined contribution plan is made automatically for participants. While it has been widely demonstrated that automatic enrollment in a defined contribution pension increases the economic security of the passive investor, significantly less attention has been placed on what the default contribution rate and asset allocation should be. The lack of scholarly research on this topic is especially troubling given that the financial services firms administering defined contribution plans already trying to control the debate about what the default asset ought to be for passively contributed pension monies. My research explores what the ‘best’ default asset is for the passive investor who is part of a low- or middle-income household – an asset that provides the greatest degree of economic security is easy for the investor to understand, and this asset is portable across employers.

Rather than having passive members of low- and middle-income households investing in conservative money market funds or risky stock index funds, I suggest that the federal government create inflation-indexed government securities that would be administered by the Treasury Department and would emulate the existing savings bond program. Such an asset allows low- and middle-income households to possess a pension account that would be portable across employers and could be borrowed against in times of need. Furthermore, this asset would provide a real rate of return for low- and middle-income households in a relatively risk-free manner. While the government would be forced to bear some administrative costs, offering such accounts would be similar to the motivation behind the government selling debt through the savings bond program (providing an asset by which low- and middle-income households can save). The sale of government securities to passive investors would also reduce our dependence on non-domestic investors who buy government treasuries (thus stabilizing the value of the dollar). To explore the consequences of low- and middle-income households possessing inflation-indexed government securities, I use the Survey of Consumer Finances and the Health and Retirement Study to trace out the effects of savings bonds (a similar government security) on the economic security of low- and middle-income households.


Dissertation

PAYING TO PUBLISH: USING THE AUTHOR CHARGE TO FUND THE SCHOLARLY JOURNAL


Asking authors to contribute to the costs of scholarly communication through an author charge pricing mechanism is increasingly being considered a credible alternative way of financing a reader-financed scholarly communication process that is widely described as facing a crisis. However the history and evolving economic justification of the author charge pricing mechanism and the potential intellectual property ramifications of having authors rather than readers pay, up to this point, has not been explored. Such a discussion however is critical to understanding the many ways by which the scholarly communication process and the research process are being re-engineered. I begin by reviewing the economics of scholarly communication literature and examining how the tools and metaphors in this literature are used to understand the serials crisis, the event where access to journals has decreased and prices and the number of titles have increased. I argue that there is a misunderstanding of the workings, determinants, and deficiencies of the scholarly communication process in both the popular and professional economics literature. This thesis focuses on one aspect of this misunderstanding – the choice of the pricing mechanism that is used to fund the scholarly communication process. Chapter one outlines the elements of the economics of science and the economics of scholarly communication research agendas and the methodological changes both have endured over the past fifty years. Chapter two reviews the various understandings of the cause of and solution to the serials crisis. The remaining three chapters consider how author charge pricing mechanisms have been used in the past in the disciplines of physics and economics and outline the potential consequences to its use in the present day environment where research funding agencies increasingly seek ownership and control over the intellectual property created during the research process. These three chapters argue that paying for the scholarly communication process is more than just an economics problem and outline a framework for a revised economics of scholarly communication research agenda.